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READING DEBOER AND OBERGEFELL
THROUGH THE “MORAL READINGS
VERSUS ORIGINALISMS” DEBATE: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL “EMPTY CUPBOARDS”
TO EVOLVING UNDERSTANDINGS
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By
James E. Fleming. 1 New York: Oxford University
Press. 2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth).
Linda C. McClain 2
Original meaning. . . . When two individuals sign a
contract to sell a house, no one thinks that, years
down the road, one party to the contract may change
the terms of the deal. That is why the parties put the
agreement in writing and signed it publicly – to prevent
changed perceptions and needs from changing the
guarantees in the agreement. So it normally goes with
the Constitution: The written charter cements the
limitations on government into an unbending bulwark,
not a vane alterable whenever alterations occur –
unless and until the people, like contracting parties,

1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished
Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law.
2. Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston
University School of Law; Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow,
University Center for Human Values, Princeton University. This essay is a
revised version of a paper prepared for the conference, “Law and
Constitutional Interpretation: Moral Readings versus Originalisms,” held at
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) on February 16-17, 2015,
in Mexico City. My thanks to Imer Flores for inviting me to participate in that
conference and to participants for helpful comments. The analysis in Part III
draws upon my portion of the Constitution Day Lecture that James E. Fleming
and I delivered at University of Missouri (Columbia) on September 17, 2015.
My research assistants Gina Del Rio Gazzo and Samantha Maurer provided
valuable help on this project. Thanks also to James Fleming for comments. A
Boston University summer research grant supported this project.
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choose to change the contract through the agreedupon mechanisms for doing so [Article V].
. . . Applied here, this approach permits today’s
marriage laws to stand until the democratic processes
say they should stand no more. From the founding of
the Republic to 2003, every State defined marriage
as a relationship between a man and a woman,
meaning that the Fourteenth Amendment permits,
though it does not require, States to define marriage
in that way.
—DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 403-04 (6th Cir.
2014) (Sutton, Jeffrey, Circuit Judge)
The majority’s “original meaning” analysis . . . can tell
us little about the Fourteenth Amendment, except to
assure us that “the people who adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment [never] understood it to
require the States to change the definition of
marriage.” The quick answer is that they undoubtedly
did not understand that it would also require school
desegregation in 1955 or the end of miscegenation
laws across the country, beginning in California in
1948 and culminating in the Loving decision in 1967
....
Moreover, . . . [t]here is not now and never has been
a universally accepted definition of marriage. . . When
Justice Alito noted in Windsor that the opponents of
DOMA were “implicitly ask[ing] us to endorse [a more
expansive definition of marriage and] to reject the
traditional view, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito,
J., dissenting), he may have been unfamiliar with all
that the “traditional view” entailed, especially for
women who were subjected to coverture as a result of
Anglo-American common law. Fourteenth Amendment
cases decided by the Supreme Court in the years
since 1971 that “invalidat[ed] various laws and
policies that categorized by sex have been part of a
transformation that has altered the very institution at
the heart of this case, marriage.” Latta [v. Otter], 771
F.3d 456, 487 [9th Cir. 2014] (Berzon, J.,
concurring).
—DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d at 431-32 (Daughtrey,
Martha Craig, Circuit Judge, dissenting)
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History really matters in Obergefell v. Hodges . . .
History, like the Constitution, can be read in more than
one way.
—Nancy F. Cott, Which History in Obergefell v. Hodges?,
PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORY (July 2015)

I. INTRODUCTION
What’s in a name? Why do labels such as “moral
reader” or “originalist” matter? The title of the
conference that generated this published symposium
suggests one context in which such labels matter:
constitutional interpretation. 3 We must consider the
merits, it implies, of two approaches in evident tension
with each other: “moral readings versus originalisms.”
As the judicial statements quoted above indicate, this
interpretive choice mattered for a practical and
momentous constitutional controversy that recently
riveted the attention of scholars, judges, legislators, and
the public: what would the United States Supreme Court
do when it considered DeBoer v. Snyder, 4 the Sixth
Circuit case in which Judge Sutton’s majority opinion
created a circuit split—disagreeing with the Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—by upholding
statutes and constitutional amendments in four states
(Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) that
excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage and
barred recognition of their valid out-of-state marriages.
On January 16, 2015, the Supreme Court granted the
petition for certiorari in that case. Amicus curiae (friends
of the court) filed a record number (147) of amicus
curiae briefs in the case, 5 proffering many different
3. The conference, held at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México on
February 16-17, 2015, was entitled “Law and Constitutional Interpretation:
Moral Readings versus Originalisms.”
4. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing lower
federal court rulings that the state statutes and constitutional amendments in
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee violated the Due Process and/or
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). DeBoer was
overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
5. Adam Liptak, Want to Be the Court’s Friend? It’s a Lot of Work, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2016, at A18 (reporting on statistics kept by Anthony J. Franze
and R. Reeves Anderson, lawyers at Arnold & Porter). The party and amicus
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constitutional pathways to reversing or affirming the
Sixth Circuit. On June 26, 2015, in Obergerfell v.
Hodges, the Court did reverse, issuing its landmark
holding that “same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry” and that the state laws at
issue were invalid “to the extent they exclude same-sex
couples from civil marriage on the same terms and
conditions as opposite-sex couples.” 6
As historian Nancy Cott observed, “history really
matter[ed]” in Justice Kennedy’s landmark majority
opinion, specifically, the history of the institution of
marriage and how it has “changed over time to admit new
understandings of liberty and equality” as well as “the
history of condemnation and criminalization of same-sex
intimacy until recent decades.”7 History also mattered in
the various dissenting opinions, for, as Cott observed,
“more than one version of the history of marriage [was]
operating.” 8 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that
marriage is an “‘unvarying social institution’” 9 and
invoked the “singular understanding of marriage [that]
has prevailed in the United States throughout our
history.” 10 Dissenting Justice Scalia insisted that “the
People’s
understanding”—“when
the
Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868”—that states did and
could (constitutionally) limit marriage to one man and one
woman “resolves these cases.”11
In this essay, I will argue that Justice Kennedy’s
landmark majority opinion in Obergefell crucially
deployed two forms of evolving understanding—of
constitutional guarantees of equality and the “promise of
briefs
are
available
at
http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/obergefell-v-hodges/.
6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
7. Nancy F. Cott, Which History in Obergefell v. Hodges?, PERSPECTIVES
ON HISTORY (Summer 2015), https://www.historians.org/publications-anddirectories/perspectives-on-history/summer-2015/which-history-inobergefell-v-hodges (describing role played in majority opinion by friends of
the court briefs filed by historians).
8. Id.
9. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 2613.
11. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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liberty” as well as of the institution of marriage. Those
two forms of evolution worked together in his opinion to
reject a static notion either of the fundamental right to
marry or of marriage itself. This approach to
constitutional reasoning exemplifies the “moral reading”
approach articulated in James E. Fleming’s recent book,

Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral
Readings and Against Originalism. As Fleming explains:

“Moral readers accept our responsibility not to retreat
from interpreting the Constitution so as to fulfill the
promise of our commitments to abstract aspirational
principles such as liberty and equality—not to retreat to
originalism” (p. 191). Such an approach, evident in
Justice Kennedy’s prior landmark LGBT rights decisions,
such as Lawrence v. Texas, 12 stresses the role of
“insight” and of generational progress in coming to see
“that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact
serve only to oppress.” 13 In Obergefell, as elaborated
below, two such examples concern the repudiation of the
laws of coverture and sex-based classifications
perpetuating gender hierarchy within marriage and of
laws barring interracial marriage.
Previewing the interpretive battle between the
Obergefell majority and the dissents (but with the sides
reversed), in DeBoer v. Snyder Judge Sutton (writing the
majority opinion) and Judge Daughtrey (in dissent) took
sharply contrasting views of the relevance of “original
meaning” with respect to the definition of marriage and
the Fourteenth Amendment. These two judges’
contrasting approaches to marriage—whether universal
and (until recently) unchanging or evolving in light of
constitutional norms of equality—are of particular
interest for the evident conflict between moral readings
and originalisms. Judge Sutton’s analysis of “original
meaning,” for example, drew critiques by some legal
scholars, who contended that there were originalist
arguments for same-sex marriage, such as a “principlesbased originalism” that “leaves room for the possibility
that we may learn from experience and systematic study
12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13. Id. at 578–79 (quoted by Fleming at pp. 59, 191).
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that laws once thought necessary and proper serve only
to needlessly oppress.” 14 Indeed, two groups of
prominent legal scholars filed amicus briefs in Obergefell
enlisting the “original meaning” of the Fourteenth
Amendment to oppose the restrictive marriage laws at
issue, 15 spurring other originalist scholars to file an
amicus brief contesting this approach to defining
“original meaning” as pushing the term “originalist” so
far that it “ceases to have any real meaning at all.” 16
Fleming’s book went to press prior to Obergefell, but
he noted the rise of “new” or “inclusive” originalist
arguments for same-sex marriage, some growing out of
new originalist justification for the Court’s sex equality
precedents (pp. 16-19). 17 He argued, however, that by
“conceiving the relevant original meaning abstractly,
rather than specifically,” and by making arguments
“about the evolving meaning” of commitment to
“abstract evolving principles,” such originalists “are
engaging in moral readings,” but without acknowledging
that they are doing so (pp. 18-19). This is a persuasive
point, and at least some originalists would agree. 18
Perhaps these new originalists should join the moral
reading big tent (as Fleming proposes (p. 96)), rather
14. Dale Carpenter, Inverted Equal Protection: Same-Sex Marriage at the
Sixth Circuit (Part 1, Originalism), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 14, 2014)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/11/14/inverted-equal-protection-same-sex-marriage-atthe-sixth-circuit-part-I/.
15. Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Inst., William N. Eskridge Jr., and Steven
Calabresi in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (Nos. 14–556, -562, -571, -574) [hereinafter Cato Institute Brief];
Brief Amicus Curiae of Legal Scholars Stephen Clark, Andrew Koppelman,
Sanford Levinson, Irina Manta, Erin Shelley and Ilya Somin, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14–556, -562, -571, -574)
[hereinafter Legal Scholars Brief].
16. Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Originalism in Support of
Respondents at 16, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14–
556, -562, -571, -574) [hereinafter Scholars of Originalism Brief].
17. See also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
2349, 2383 n. 192 (2015) (noting that “many originalists did suggest that
there were plausible originalist arguments in favor of the claimants’ position”
in Obergefell and listing examples).
18. See, e.g., Scholars of Originalism Brief, supra note 16, at 15–16 and
discussion infra Part III.

MCCLAIN READING DEBOER CONST COMM_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/1/2017 2:33 PM

ON EVOLVING UNDERSTANDINGS

447

than recruit others to a new, “inclusive” originalist big
tent. 19 My primary interest in this essay, however, is not
to adjudicate whether the new originalism is a defensible
form of originalism, but instead to examine the
respective roles of moral readings and originalism in
DeBoer and then Obergefell. It is telling that (1) none of
the conservative Justices—all of whom dissented—
embraced the new originalism in Obergefell, and that (2)
although “meaning” and “understanding” feature
centrally in Kennedy’s majority opinion, they have less to
do with fixed or “original” meaning or understanding than
with evolving meaning and new understandings of
constitutional guarantees and principles. An analysis of
Obergefell (and, more broadly, the recent marriage
equality litigation leading up to it) suggests that moral
readings of the Constitution have played a significant role
in making it less of (in Justice Ginsburg’s words) an
“empty cupboard” for gay men and lesbians, just as they
have played a role in making it less empty in the context
of sex equality claims. 20 As the Court’s gender revolution
in interpreting Equal Protection was unfolding, Ginsburg
(then a pioneering litigator and scholar) insisted that:
“Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from
the original understanding, is required to tie to the
fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause a
command that government treat men and women as
individuals equal in rights, responsibilities, and
opportunities.” 21 Not surprisingly, in light of the long
history of “empty-cupboard” jurisprudence and, for
much of U.S. history, the absence of sex equality from
19. Baude articulates an “inclusive originalism” and further contends that
it is “our law,” in terms of current constitutional practices. See Baude, supra
note 17. For Fleming’s critique of Baude, see pp. 15-19.
20. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal
Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 164.
21. Id. at 161. Some newer strands of originalism challenge Ginsburg’s
argument by advancing an account of “fidelity to the original public meaning”
of the Fourteenth Amendment, under which reading that amendment’s “anticaste principle” in light of the Nineteenth Amendment leads “inexorably to the
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits sex discrimination.” See
Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination,
90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 46 (2011) (drawing on Reva Siegel, She the People: The
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 947 (2002)).
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the “constitutional canon,”22 feminist scholars are
generally not among the ranks of originalists. 23
Nonetheless, even if the interpretive and historical
projects in which new originalists are engaging may
strain the label of “originalism,” and may be better cast
as forms of a moral reading of the Constitution, they are
valuable in encouraging critical reflection upon how and
why sex discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination were part of the historical practices in the
United States but are now recognizably inconsistent with
our constitutional commitments and aspirational
principles.
In Part II, I analyze the majority and dissenting
opinions in DeBoer, focusing on their competing
approaches to the relevance of “original meaning” of the
Fourteenth Amendment and to the definition and history
of marriage. I argue that the dissent offers a more
persuasive approach, in stressing the transformation of
marriage and gradual elimination of discriminatory
marriage laws. In characterizing this as a moral reading,
I also highlight the role that a moral reading played in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 24 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ pathbreaking
opinion interpreting the Massachusetts constitution to
require extending civil marriage to same-sex couples,
which (as I elaborate in Part III) serves as a template for
Obergefell. Part III first discusses new originalist
arguments made in amicus briefs urging reversal of the
Sixth Circuit, and counterarguments made in briefs
challenging such use of originalism. I then observe the
evident rejection of such new originalist approaches in
the four dissents in Obergefell, which instead appealed
22. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional
Canon, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1715.

23. Notably, Mary Anne Case, who propounds a “feminist
fundamentalism” theory of constitutional interpretation, reports that she had
not given much thought to originalism until she “accepted the invitation from
the Federalist Society to appear as the only woman with a speaking part” in
their national symposium, Originalism 2.0. Mary Anne Case, The Ladies?
Forget About Them. A Feminist Perspective on the Limits of Originalism, 29
CONST. COMM. 431 (2014).
24. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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to original meaning and understanding to conclude that
state marriage laws survived challenge under the
Fourteenth Amendment. I argue that Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, is best understood as offering a
moral reading of the Constitution. Twin forms of
evolution – of understanding constitutional guarantees
and of the institution of marriage – animate his opinion.
I argue that the similar treatment of those twin forms of
evolution in Goodridge provided a template for
Kennedy’s opinion, as well as for his rejection of a
narrow originalism that focuses on historical practices or
original intent. History, for Kennedy (aided by friends of
the court briefs filed by historians), was the beginning
but not the end of the matter. In Part IV, I conclude.
II. DEBOER V. SNYDER: “ORIGINAL MEANING” OR
TRANSFORMATION OF “TRADITION”?
In his majority opinion in DeBoer v. Snyder, Judge
Sutton begins and ends with propositions about how
“change” should occur “under the United States
Constitution,” contending that changing the definition of
marriage to include same-sex couples should be left to
“state democratic processes” rather than to federal
judges. 25 I focus here on how forms of originalism shape
Sutton’s opinion, contrasting it with the dissenting Judge
Daughtrey’s emphatic rejection of such originalism.
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION: “ORIGINAL MEANING” FORBIDS A
CONSTRUCTION ZONE
“Original meaning” features in the majority’s
approach both to interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment and to affirming the “traditional definition of
marriage.” Subsequently, as discussed in Part III, some
of the Obergefell dissents would embrace similar
approaches. As is evident in the passage quoted at the
beginning of this essay, Judge Sutton contends that the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was laid
down at its ratification. Far from there being (to use
25. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014); see id. at
420 (“This case ultimately presents two ways to think about change.”).
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terms in Fleming’s book) a “construction zone” or any
appropriate “building out” of constitutional principles
such as liberty or equality (pp. 33, 139-40), the
“originally understood meaning” is instead an
“unbending bulwark;” indeed, the “written charter
cements” limits on government. 26 It is not a weather
“vane,” “alterable whenever alterations occur.”27 In
other words, by contrast to certain forms of new
originalism, there should be no “updating” in
interpreting or applying “fixed” constitutional provisions
(or principles) in light of new facts or changing social
understandings. 28
Sutton acknowledges that the “line between
interpretation and evolution” in determining the “original
meaning” of a constitutional provision “blurs from time
to time”; after all, “the Fourteenth Amendment is old;
the people ratified it in 1868,” and “it is generally
worded.” 29 Nonetheless: “Nobody in this case . . .
argues that the people who adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment understood it to require the States to
change the definition of marriage.” 30 Instead, Sutton
continues by appealing to “tradition,” noting the
continuity in the definition of marriage in the states
“[f]rom the founding of the Republic to 2003” 31 (the
year of Goodridge). Consistent with this static view of
traditional marriage, it is Washington v. Glucksberg that
Sutton enlists in support of “the import of original

26. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 403.
27. Id.
28. By contrast to Judge Sutton, for example, Ilya Somin, who advances
a sex discrimination argument for marriage equality, argues that originalist
methodology is “entirely consistent with updating the application of [the
Fourteenth Amendment’s] fixed principles in light of new factual information,”
and such updating is “not only permitted but actually required by the theory.”
Ilya Somin, William Eskridge on Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/01/23/william-eskridge-on-originalism-and-same-sexmarriage/.
29. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 403.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 404.
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meaning in legal debates.” 32 Strikingly absent here, as
the dissent points out, is any attention to the tension
between original meaning and the role of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the subsequent transformation of certain
features of marriage present in 1868 – such as
coverture and antimiscegenation laws.
The majority opinion sounds a theme familiar both
from state and federal constitutional litigation over
marriage equality and from legislative arguments in favor
of constitutional amendments: until 2004, when due to
Goodridge, marriage became available to same-sex
couples in Massachusetts, marriage had a fixed and
shared meaning. Not only does that meaning of marriage
as “between a man and a woman” date back to “the
founding,”33 Judge Sutton argues, it dates back
“thousands of years.” 34 Accepting as a rational basis for
state marriage bans that states “might wish to wait and
see before changing a norm that our society (like all
others) has accepted for centuries,” he contrasts the
comparatively shorter time line of the experiment with
same-sex marriage:
The fair question is whether in 2004, one year after
Goodridge, Michigan voters could stand by the
traditional definition of marriage. How can we say that
the voters acted irrationally for sticking with the seen
benefits of thousands of years of adherence to the
traditional definition of marriage in the face of one year
of experience with a new definition of marriage. . . . A
Burkean sense of caution does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, least of all when measured by
a timeline less than a dozen years long . . . . 35

Sutton asserts: “A dose of humility makes us
hesitant to condemn as unconstitutionally irrational a
view of marriage shared not long ago by every society in
the world, shared by most, if not all, of our ancestors,

32. Id. at 403 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–19
(1997)).
33. Id. at 404.
34. Id. at 406.
35. Id.
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and shared still today by a significant number of the
States.” 36
That view of marriage is, in effect, the by-now
familiar “responsible procreation” or channelling
argument offered as a rational basis for state marriage
definitions that exclude same-sex couples. Although, in
post-Windsor constitutional litigation, the other four
circuit courts had rejected the responsible procreation
argument, as does Judge Daughtrey in her dissent, Judge
Sutton concludes it is one possible rational basis for the
state laws under challenge. State marriage laws make
sense, he asserts, if one starts with the premise that
“governments got into . . . and remain in the business of
defining marriage, not to regulate love but to regulate
sex, most especially the intended and unintended effects
of male-female intercourse,” and to ensure parental
investment in and commitment to “the natural effects of
male-female intercourse: children.”37 Notably, he finds
that “[i]t is not society’s laws or . . . any one religion’s
laws, but nature’s laws (that men and women
complement each other biologically), that created the
policy imperative” for marriage and, thus, “governments
typically are not second-guessed under the Constitution
for prioritizing how they tackle such issues.” 38
Sutton’s account of the familiar “channelling”
argument about the origins of marriage appeals to
history and nature, specifically, to assumed factual
premises
about
the
two
sexes
and
gender
complementarity. On this account, the state may
rationally restrict marriage only to heterosexuals
because only they may accidentally or unintentionally
procreate and, thus, they particularly need the
inducement of the many benefits linked to marriage to
anchor their commitment to the children their sexual
relations may produce. In contemporary marriage
equality litigation, an early articulation of this channelling
argument featured in Justice Cordy’s dissent in
36. Id. at 404.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 405.
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Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. 39 It also
features in Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell

(as discussed in Part III, below). Cordy advances, as I
elaborate in other work, a conception of marriage as a
social institution designed to solve a problem presented
by nature, or evolution. 40 Cordy drew on James Q.
Wilson’s The Marriage Problem (also cited by Roberts),
which identified that evolutionary problem as the sexual
and reproductive asymmetry of men and women in the
state of nature and the need for a mechanism to anchor
men to women and to children. 41 Even on the terms of
this single purpose, a historical account of marriage,
Judge Sutton fails to explain the logic of how excluding
same-sex couples from marriage advances state
purposes. 42
Finally, the majority opinion’s reliance on some form
of originalism and rejection of a moral reading is also
evident in its emphatic rejection of what it calls an
“evolving
meaning”
approach
to
constitutional
interpretation, which it understands to entail looking at
“evolving moral and policy considerations.” 43 Quoting
the landmark sex equality case, United States v. Virginia,
Judge
Sutton
acknowledges
a
conception
of
constitutional interpretation that moves toward better
realization of aspirational principles: “‘A prime part of
the history of our Constitution . . . is the story of the
extension of constitutional rights . . . to people once
ignored or excluded.’” 44 He observes that the Court has
39. 798 N.E.2d 941, 983, 995–96 (Cordy, J, dissenting).
40. I have written about the channelling function and its role in marriage
equality litigation in Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage:
Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133
(2007).
41. 798 N.E.2d at 995-96 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE
PROBLEM 23-32 (2002)); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Wilson). For analysis of Wilson and
the role his work has played in marriage equality litigation, see Linda C.
McClain, James Q. Wilsons’s–and Society’s–Marriage Problem, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2511229.
42. My aim here is not to criticize this argument, which, as I point out
infra, Daughtrey does effectively, enlisting Judge Posner’s trenchant critique
in Baskin v. Bogan.
43. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 416.
44. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996)).
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looked to “evolving moral and policy considerations
before,” so “Why not do so here?” 45 His answer is a
curious account of constitutional evolution and “living
constitutionalism.” To wit: “a principled jurisprudence of
constitutional evolution turns on evolution in society’s
values, not evolution in judges’ values”; 46 while “every
generation has the right to govern itself,” this means that
until society has “ moved past” certain principles, judges
must not “anticipat[e] principles that society has yet to
embrace.”47 This conception of “living constitutionalism”
entails that courts should not get ahead of “democratic
majorities,” who should be given judicial deference in
“deciding within reasonable bounds when and whether to
embrace an evolving, as opposed to settled, societal
norm.” 48 The court distinguishes Lawrence, where only
a minority of states still had anti-sodomy laws, from the
instant case, in which over thirty states would still bar
same-sex
marriage
but
for
“federal-court
intervention.”49 Rather than seeking vindication through
“creation of a new constitutional right” as a way to
remedy the “loss of . . . dignity and respect,” plaintiffs,
Judge Sutton argues, should turn to the actual source of
this loss—“the neighborhoods and communities in which
gay and lesbian couples live”; 50 and such couples should
work to forge a new community “consensus” there, thus
“earn[ing] victories through initiatives and legislation and
the greater acceptance that comes with them.” 51 Urging
that persuading a majority of citizens to “dignify and
respect the rights of minority groups through
majoritarian laws” is preferable to doing so “through
decisions issued by a majority of Supreme Court
Justices,” the court adds: “Rights need not be
countermajoritarian to count.”52 Sutton closes his
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 417.
at 416.
at 417.
at 418.
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opinion by returning to the themes of tradition and
change: states—free from judicial intervention—must be
allowed to decide whether to “expand a definition of
marriage that until recently was universally followed
going back to the earliest days of human history”; 53
citizens will be “heroes of their own stories” if they
resolve this issue outside of the courts. 54
B. JUDGE DAUGHTREY’S DISSENT: DEBUNKING AN “ORIGINAL
MEANING” APPROACH TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
MARRIAGE
Judge Sutton’s static conception of marriage
contrasts strikingly with the picture of marriage
recounted in Judge Daughtrey’s dissent, which identifies
the problems with the appeal to “original meaning” as a
way of resolving the federal constitutional challenge to
restrictive state marriage laws. As we will see, this
dissent has echoes in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
in Obergefell. As the passage quoted at the beginning of
this essay indicates, Daughtrey counters Sutton’s appeal
to “original meaning” and his argument that “the
people,” in 1868, did not understand the Fourteenth
Amendment to “‘require the States to change the
definition of marriage’” to permit same-sex couples to
marry with the rejoinder that they also “undoubtedly did
not understand that it would also require school
desegregation in 1955 or the end of miscegenation laws
across the country, beginning in California in 1948 and
culminating in the Loving decision in 1967.” 55 Here
Daughtrey stresses the challenge of realizing the
Constitution’s commitments and stresses the role of
courts in that realization: even after “a civil war, the end
of slavery, and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
in 1868, extensive litigation has been necessary to
achieve even a modicum of constitutional protection from
discrimination based on race, and it has occurred
primarily by judicial decree, not by the democratic
election process to which the majority suggests we
53. Id. at 421.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 431 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
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should defer regarding discrimination based on sexual
orientation.”56
Daughtrey also challenges Sutton’s picture of a
universal and—until recently—unchanging definition of
marriage: “there is not now and never has been a
universally accepted definition of marriage.” 57 For
starters, “even today, polygynous marriages outnumber
monogamous ones.” 58 Judge Posner makes this point
emphatically in Baskin v. Bogan, observing that there is
no acknowledgment of polygyny when the State of
Wisconsin appeals to “the wonders of tradition” by
referring to “‘thousands of years of collective
experience’” as establishing “‘traditional marriage,
between one man and one woman, as optimal for the
family, society, and civilization.’” 59 Daughtrey further
observes that, in different historical periods and
countries, marriage has been “about” many things,
including religious obligation and political and economic
arrangements. 60
Historically, marriage was also “about” gender
inequality, a dimension largely missing from Sutton’s
account. Daughtrey observes that (as quoted above)
when Justice Alito noted in Windsor that the opponents
of DOMA were “implicitly ask[ing] us to endorse [a more
expansive definition of marriage and] to reject the
traditional view,” he “may have been unfamiliar with all
that the ‘traditional view’ entailed, especially for women
who were subjected to coverture as a result of AngloAmerican common law.” 61 Elaborating upon marriage’s
history as a “profoundly unequal institution, one that
imposed distinctly different rights and obligations on
men and women,” 62 Daughtrey quotes at length from
Judge Barbara Berzon’s concurring opinion in Latta v.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
(2013)
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 667 (7th Cir. 2014).
DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 431.
Id. at 432 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718
(Alito, J., dissenting)).
Id.
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Otter, in which Berzon argued that Idaho and Nevada’s
“same-sex marriage bans” were unconstitutional
because “they are classifications on the basis of gender”
that do not survive intermediate scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. 63 Daughtrey details the magnitude of
this sex inequality within marriage to make a point about
constitutional transformation and the limits of an appeal
to “original meaning”: “Fourteenth Amendment cases
decided by the Supreme Court in the years since 1971
that ‘invalidat[ed] various laws and policies that
categorized by sex have been part of a transformation
that has altered the very institution at the heart of this
case, marriage.’” 64 The significance of 1971, of course,
is that Reed v. Reed, decided that year, signaled the
beginning of the Court’s turning away from what Ruth
Bader
Ginsburg
coined
the
“empty-cupboard
interpretation of equal protection in relation to sex
equality claims.” 65 The significance of this constitutional
transformation for purposes of appeals to the “traditional
definition of marriage” is, as Berzon and Daughtrey
argue, that marriage as an institution has undergone
deep transformation. Daughtrey sums up: “The
majority’s admiration for ‘traditional marriage’ thus
seems misplaced, if not naive. The legal status has been
through so many reforms that the marriage of same-sex
couples constitutes merely the latest wave in a vast sea
of change.”66
While Sutton, like Cordy, posits an age-old purpose
of regulating sex as the reason government got into the
marriage business, Daughtrey and Berzon appeal to
historians of the family, such as Nancy Cott, who show
that the Founders’ political theory viewed marriage as a
metaphor for consent by the governed (the wife freely
consented to the husband’s governance of the

63. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J.,
concurring).
64. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 432 (quoting Latta, 771 F.3d at 487 (Berzon,
J., concurring)).
65. Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 167.
66. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 434.
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household). 67 As these jurists observe, the loss of
women’s civil capacity and identity was bound up in
reciprocal, but complementary, gender roles. 68 As Cott
and Linda Kerber elaborate, marriage performed
important work because, within the family, wives gentled
men and taught them manners and mothers cultivated
virtue in their children. 69 Moreover, as Hendrik Hartog
(another historian cited by Daughtrey and Berzon)
elaborates, “the corollary of wife’s obedience was
husband’s authority.” 70 Further, “[i]mplicit in the idea of
coverture was [an] image . . . of a wife as the possession
of her husband, as [a] husband’s property.”71 All of this
gender work going on within the marital household is
distinct from the “responsible procreation” argument
that Sutton and others insist has always been the reason
to regulate marriage. Certainly, the combination of
criminal and marital law drew a sharp line between licit
and illicit sex and between marital and nonmarital
children. However, as Daughtrey points out, “although
sex was strongly presumed to be an essential part of
marriage, the ability to procreate was not.” 72
Daughtrey observes that Cott, an expert witness who
testified on behalf of the plaintiffs in the trial in DeBoer
concerning whether there were rational bases for
Michigan’s restrictive marriage laws, “explained how the
concept of marriage and the roles of marriage partners
have changed over time.” 73 One example was the erosion
of coverture and of “traditional gender-assigned roles”;
another was that “interracial marriages are legal now that
67. NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 916 (1999).
68. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 432-33 (quoting Latta, 771 F.3d at 487
(Berzon, J., concurring); COTT, supra note 67; and other sources).
69. COTT, supra note 67, at 19–21; see also LINDA KERBER, WOMEN OF THE
REPUBLIC 199-200 (1980). For further discussion of the family as a seedbed
of civic virtue (despite sex inequality), see LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF
FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 56-64 (2006).
70. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 149-50 (2000).
71. Id. at 137. Daughtrey reproduces a passage from Judge Berzon’s
concurrence that cites Hartog on a husband’s possessory interest in his wife.
DeBoer, 773 F.3d at 432–33 (quoting HARTOG, supra note 70, at 137).
72. DeBoer, 773 F.3d at 433.
73. Id. at 425.
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the antiquated, racist concept of preserving the purity of
the white race has fallen into its rightful place of
dishonor.”74
Daughtrey also summarizes the holdings and
reasoning of the four circuit courts that had (by then)
struck down state marriage laws to show, in effect, the
importance of a moral reading. In other words, over time,
the Nation better realizes the Constitution’s abstract
commitments to liberty and equality and the aspirational
principles entailed in those provisions. In Bostic v.
Schaefer, for example, the Fourth Circuit read Loving to
illustrate that “‘the right to marry is an expansive liberty
interest that may stretch to accommodate changing
societal norms.’” 75 The Fourth Circuit, Judge Daughtrey
observes, pointed to the “principle” articulated by
Justice Kennedy in United States v. Windsor—invoking
Loving in support—that “‘[s]tate laws defining and
regulating marriage, of course, must respect the
constitutional rights of persons.’” 76 Loving has been
enormously
significant
in
this
post-Windsor
jurisprudence as a vital precedent for the fundamental
right to marry and for the argument that such a right
must not be read narrowly, but broadly to include the
freedom to marry the person of one’s choice (regardless
of race or gender). 77
To connect this to the sex discrimination argument
for a constitutional challenge to the one man-one woman
marriage definition, the entire edifice of domestic
relations law rested on gender hierarchy, (subsequently)
separate spheres ideology, and premises of gender
ordering. A combination of state law reform and
74. Id.
75. 760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014).
76. DeBoer, 773 F.3d at 429 (citing Bostic, 760 F. 3d at 379 (quoting
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691)).
77. See, e.g., Bostic, 760 F.3d at 384 (concluding that excluding samesex couples from marriage excludes them “from participating fully in our
society, which is precisely the type of segregation that the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot countenance”); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 477–78
(9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citing Loving in rejecting a narrow
definition of the right to marry that would confine it to those historically
allowed to exercise it and embracing evolving interpretation of “liberty”).
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constitutional litigation (including the shift away from the
“empty-cupboard” interpretation of the Equal Protection
clause) has dismantled nearly all of that edifice. The one
man-one woman definition, one may plausibly argue, is a
vestige of coverture and the “sex-based legal rules once
imbedded in the institution” and also reflects gender
stereotyping because it related to the different,
complementary roles or offices that husbands and wives
were to perform as head of the household and obedient
and dependent feme covert. 78
C. GOODRIDGE AS A TEMPLATE FOR DUAL EVOLUTION AND A
MORAL READING
Family law scholars and historians of marriage will
find the conception of marriage as an evolving institution
set out in Judge Daughtrey’s dissent, in Judge Berzon’s
concurrence, and in other judicial opinions far more
persuasive as a matter of history than Judge Sutton’s
(and, subsequently, than the opinions of the dissenting
justices in Obergefell), 79 just as moral readers will find
it a better account of realization of aspirational principles
and generational moral progress. If Justice Cordy’s
dissent in Goodridge provides an early template for a
universally understood, not fundamentally changing
conception of marriage (originating in channelling
responsible procreation), then a template for the
conception of marriage as an evolving institution, shaped
by remedying injustices within it, features in Chief
Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Goodridge. This
78. See Latta, 771 F.3d at 490 (Berzon, B., J. concurring) (citing Baker
v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). It is beyond the scope of this Essay to discuss the many
scholarly sources advancing this argument.
79. Such scholars have also contributed amicus briefs elaborating that
evolution. See Cott, supra note 7 (discussing role of such briefs in Obergefell);
Amici Curiae Brief of the Professors of the History of Marriage, Families, and
the Law at 2, Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.32d 941 (Mass.
2003) (No. SCJ-08860), (arguing that: “allowing same-sex couples to
participate as full citizens in the institution of marriage is not a radical
change,” but “the logical next step in this Court’s long tradition of reforming
marriage to fit the evolving nature of committed intimate relationships and the
rights of the individuals in those relationships”). The author of this essay was
a signatory to this brief filed in Goodridge.
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pathbreaking opinion also warrants mention for paving
the way for Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion,
particularly in the way it uses history. Evolution away
from race and sex discrimination in the law of marriage
is part of this conception. Marshall looks to the “long
history” in many states, including Massachusetts, during
which “no lawful marriage was possible between black
and white Americans,” but observes that “long history”
did not prevent, first, the California Supreme Court, and,
subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court to rule that such
laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 80 So, too, in
the case of the bar on same-sex marriage, Marshall
argues, “history must yield to a more fully developed
understanding of the invidious quality of the
discrimination.” 81
Marshall offers a moral reading, quoting the very
passage from VMI that Sutton invokes, to different
effect: “The history of constitutional law ‘is the story of
the extension of constitutional rights and protections to
people once ignored or excluded,’” evident in Supreme
Court precedents striking down sex and race
discrimination as contrary to Equal Protection.82
Marshall finds that this is as true for “civil marriage” as
for other areas of “civil rights,” offering the demise of
both antimiscegenation law and coverture as examples:
As a public institution and a right of fundamental
importance, civil marriage is an evolving paradigm.
The common law was exceptionally harsh toward
women who became wives: a woman’s legal identity all
but evaporated into that of her husband. . . . But since
at least the middle of the Nineteenth Century, both the
courts and the legislature have acted to ameliorate the
harshness of the common law regime. . . . Alarms over
the imminent erosion of the “natural” order of
marriage were sounded over the demise of
antimiscegenation laws, the expansion of the rights of
married women, and the introduction of “no fault”
divorce. Marriage has survived all of these

80. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 966.
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transformations, and we have no doubt that marriage
will continue to be a vibrant and revered institution. 83

In this passage, Marshall not only analogizes to prior
forms of discriminatory marriage laws to situate the
present challenge by same-sex couples, but also
concludes that marriage as an institution has survived
seeming challenges to the “natural” order of things and
predicts that it will continue to do so. 84
Finally, Marshall adopts a moral reading in declaring
that the Court has authority to provide a remedy by
“constru[ing] civil marriage to mean the voluntary union
of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all
others.” 85 She explains that such a remedy is “entirely
consonant with established principles of jurisprudence
empowering a court to refine a common-law principle in
light of evolving constitutional standards.” 86 Concurring
Justice Greaney expressly rejects an “original intent”
approach to constitutional interpretation, indicating that
“the provisions of our Constitution are, and must be,
adaptable to changing circumstances and new social
phenomena.”87
III. “MORAL READINGS VERSUS ORIGINALISMS” IN

OBERGEFELL

In the wake of the circuit split created by DeBoer,
and the Supreme Court granting certiorari, amici filed a
record number of amicus curiae briefs. 88 These set forth
many constitutional pathways for reversing or affirming
the Sixth Circuit. Most pertinent for this essay are (1)
those briefs filed by legal scholars enlisting originalism
83. Id. at 966–67.
84. Id. at 967. Concurring Justice Greaney invoked these changes in
marriage law in making a sex discrimination argument against the one manone woman definition. Id. at 970-74 (Greaney, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 969.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 974 n.6 (Greaney, J., concurring) (disagreeing with dissenting
Justice Cordy’s argument that because “the people,” when they revised the
Massachusetts Constitution in 1976, did not intend it to be “relied upon to
approve same-sex marriage,” it cannot now be used to reach that result).
88. See Liptak, supra note 5 (147 briefs).
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either to strike down or uphold the restrictive state
marriage laws and (2) those filed by historians to
delineate the history of marriage and of the treatment of
LGBT persons in the United States.
In this Part, I first discuss various new originalist
arguments made in Obergefell and challenged by other
originalist scholars. I point out that the Obergefell
dissenters hued closer to what Fleming would call
conventional forms of originalism than the new
originalism, similar to that of Judge Sutton in DeBoer. I
then argue that Justice Kennedy’s majority in Obergefell
is more compatible with a moral reading than with an
originalist one in its focus on the dual evolution of
understanding constitutional principles and of the
institution of marriage. Notably, while Kennedy did not
enlist the new originalist briefs or arguments, he did
draw upon the briefs filed by historians and historians of
marriage in his discussion of the relevance of history.
A. COMPETING VISIONS OF ORIGINALISM
The Cato Institute, along with William Eskridge Jr.,
Steven Calabresi, and several other legal scholars, filed
an amicus brief arguing that the DeBoer majority opinion
“erred by focusing on a certain kind of original
understanding” of the Equal Protection Clause—“the
immediate effect supporters ‘understood’ the Fourteenth
Amendment to have”—rather than on “original
meaning.” 89 Amici contended that the latter approach is
that taken by the Supreme Court, under which it “has
asked how the well-established meaning of terminology
added to the Constitution in 1868 applies to modern
89. Cato Institute Brief, supra note 15, at 3. One signatory to the brief,
William Eskridge, is a pioneer in the field of sexual orientation and the law and
an advocate of dynamic statutory interpretation, perhaps making his turn to
originalism surprising. Ilya Somin, a signatory on a different amicus brief
enlisting originalism (The Legal Scholars Brief, supra note 15, discussed
infra), observes that while “Eskridge himself is not an originalist—at least not
in the sense of believing that originalism generally trumps other modes of
constitutional interpretation, . . . as Michael Ramsey notes, ‘[i]t says
something about originalism’s new place that the most prominent academic
defender of same sex marriage makes the text’s original meaning the
centerpiece of his argument.’” Somin, supra note 28, at 1-2.
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exclusion of new as well as established social groups.” 90
On this approach, it would not be controlling that “there
is no evidence that ‘the people who adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment understood it to require the
States to change the definition of marriage.’” 91 The Cato
Institute Brief argues that the “original meaning” of the
Equal Protection Clause is “the protection of equal
laws,” and that it “prohibits caste legislation that
discriminates against a social class, ‘not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else.’”92 While “original understanding” will not
suffice to justify certain Equal Protection precedents,
this original meaning approach can do so.
The Cato Institute Brief articulates one form of what
Fleming would call “new originalism”: it contends that
“original-meaning originalism ‘is entirely consistent with
updating the application of its fixed principles in light of
new factual information. Indeed, such updating is often
not only permitted, but actually required by the
theory.’”93 On this approach, while there was “no class
of ‘gay people’ who could be targets of a caste regime”
in 1868, a legal regime subsequently developed that
“defined ‘homosexuals’ as a pariah class outside the
general benefits and protections of the laws”; 94 recently
enacted state defense of marriage statutes and
constitutional amendments “expanded” this caste
regime. 95 Seen in this light, then, “updating” involves
recognizing that “distinctions between opposite-sex and
same-sex couples do not serve any legitimate interest
and are instead founded on the core stereotypes that
have underwritten the past century’s anti-gay
legislation.”96
90. Cato Institute Brief, supra note 15, at 3 (citing VMI; Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
91. Id. at 2–3 (quoting DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 403 (6th Cir.
2014)).
92. Id. at 3 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
93. Id. at 4 (citing Somin, supra note 28).
94. Id. at 18.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 24–25.
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The second brief that enlisted a form of new
originalism to challenge restrictive state marriage laws
was filed by Andrew Koppelman and several other legal
scholars. It makes a sex discrimination argument: laws
forbidding same-sex couples to marry classify on the
basis of sex and often rest on impermissible gender
stereotypes and, thus, require intermediate scrutiny.97
As discussed in Part II, Judge Berzon’s Latta
concurrence and some other judicial opinions make this
argument. What this brief adds is the contention that
“laws restricting the right to marry on the basis of
gender go against . . . the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 98 As does the Cato Institute,
this second brief criticizes Judge Sutton’s claim that
those laws “are consistent with the original meaning,
because few if any observers in 1868 would have
thought otherwise.” 99 They counter that “as most
originalists recognize today, the original expected
applications of the framers are distinct from the original
understanding of the meaning of the text. Only the latter
is controlling law.” 100 This form of originalism, to use
Fleming’s framework, seems to be “abstract originalism”
in that it recognizes that “[m]any important provisions of
the Constitution establish broad, general principles that
must be applied to factual conditions that can change
over time.” 101 However, it is not the principles that seem
to evolve, but “our understanding of the relevant facts
. . . as new evidence accumulates.” 102 It is “changes in
factual understanding” from 1868 to the present that
support an argument, today, that restrictive marriage
laws are a prohibited form of sex discrimination; for in
1868, “the drafters and ratifiers of the [14th]
97. Legal Scholars Brief, supra note 15. Koppelman, one author on the
brief, is known for advancing the argument that discrimination against gay men
and lesbians (including restrictions on the right to marry) is sex discrimination;
like Eskridge, he is not generally viewed as an originalist. See Andrew
Koppleman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).
98. Legal Scholars Brief, supra note 15, at 23-24.
99. Id. at 24.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.

MCCLAIN READING DEBOER CONST COMM_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

5/1/2017 2:33 PM

466
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY
31:441

[Vol.

amendment believed that many forms of sex
discrimination were compatible with the Amendment’s
general ban on ‘class’ and ‘caste’ discrimination.”103
Indeed, the Legal Scholars Brief chronicles the long
history of appeals to “natural” differences between men
and women to justify laws that discriminated on the basis
of gender, including laws about gender roles within
marriage. 104 Such would be the assumptions of “most
Americans in 1868.” 105 The authors draw parallels
between present-day recognition of the unsoundness of
nineteenth century assumptions about gender roles
within marriage and “overwhelming evidence” today
indicating that “same-sex marriages are capable of
carrying out the major social purposes of opposite-sex
marriage, including raising children and strengthening
social ties.” 106
Obliquely addressing a question posed two years
earlier by Justice Scalia in the oral argument over the
constitutional challenge to Proposition 8—about the date
on which laws banning same-sex marriage became
unconstitutional—the brief contends: “In order to justify
striking down laws banning same-sex marriage, we need
not identify exactly when the accumulation of evidence
became great enough to be decisive, only that it reached
that point at some time before the present case came
before the court.”107
Both of these briefs reject the narrow “original
meaning” approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit in favor
103. Id. at 25. The authors give the example of Robert Bork’s account of
why the Court in Brown v. Board of Education was justified because “[b]y
1954 . . . it had been apparent for some time that segregation rarely if ever
produced equality.” Id. (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 82
(1990)).
104. Id. at 26–27.
105. Id. at 27.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 27–28 (citing Ilya Somin, How to Figure Out When Laws Banning

Same-Sex Marriage Became Unconstitutional, and Why the Precise Date May
Not Matter, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 26, 2013, 11:44 PM),

http://volokh.com/2-13/03/26/how-to-figure-out-when-laws-banning-samesex-marriage-became-unconstitutional-and-why-the-precise-date-may-notmatter/).
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of what Fleming might call “abstract originalism,” which
is more like a moral reading than conventional
originalism. These brief authors might resist his
argument that they are engaging in a moral reading
because they insist that the moving parts are not
evolution in understanding of principles of equality or
liberty, but evolution in understanding of facts and the
application of those principles to facts. Is this a
distinction with a difference? Certainly, evaluating those
facts requires some exercise of moral and political
judgment. On this question of the boundaries of
originalism, two observations based on the Obergefell
record may be helpful. First, it is telling that some
originalist legal scholars (including Lawrence Alexander
and Steven D. Smith), along with the Marriage Law
Foundation, filed an amicus brief specifically challenging
the Cato Institute’s account of “original meaning” and
contending that the Cato Institute Brief’s approach was
more akin to that of Ronald Dworkin, a “sophisticated
critic of originalist constitutionalism.” 108 Indeed,
Fleming views Dworkin as a leading exemplar of a moral
reading approach (pp. 11, 73-74); the Scholars of
Originalism Brief characterizes Dworkin’s approach as
one where “judges should enforce the general ‘concepts’
reflected in the Constitution, not the specific
‘conceptions’ contemplated by the enactors.” 109 While
Dworkin and similar critics of originalism specifically
acknowledged that “they were opposing historical
meaning as an authoritative criterion,” the Cato Brief
exemplifies a tack of making “prodigious use of the
‘abstraction’ strategy, while continuing to claim the label
of ‘originalism.’” 110 Indeed, the Scholars of Originalism
Brief asserts that while there may be “definite
advantages, at least within the academy, in turning
‘originalism’ into a big tent that can include almost
anyone,” such as “dispel[ling] some of the hostility that
originalism has sometimes provoked,” “if ‘original
meaning’ is defined so loosely that virtually everyone and
108. Scholars of Originalism Brief, supra note 16, at 15.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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every decision can be classed as ‘originalist,’ the term
ceases to have any real meaning at all.” 111 (These
criticisms echo those Fleming makes of Baude’s
“inclusive originalism.” (pp. 15-19)) Finally, the authors
proffer their most serious objection to this “theoretical
conception of ‘original meaning’ that is highly abstract
and separated from the ‘understanding’ of constitutional
enactors and ratifiers”:
[it] defeats the goal of permitting “We the People,”
acting through our elected representatives in
Congress and the state legislatures, to deliberate
intelligently and understandingly about proposed
constitutional measures, and then to decide whether
or not to entrench those measures in our
constitutional law. 112

Second, none of the conservative members of the
Court—all of whom dissented in Obergefell—accepted
these newer approaches to original meaning. Instead,
they hued closer to the approach taken by Judge Sutton.
Justice
Scalia
insisted
that
“the
People’s
understanding”—“when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868”—that states did and could
(constitutionally) limit marriage to one man and one
woman “resolves these cases.” 113 As Cott observes,
“more than one version of the history of marriage [was]
operating” in Obergefell. 114 Chief Justice Roberts viewed
marriage as an “unvarying social institution.” He
asserted that the “singular understanding of marriage”—
as the union of one man and one woman—“has prevailed
in the United States throughout our history,” so that “to
those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, this
conception of marriage and family ‘was a given. . . .’”115
Further, because “the Constitution itself says nothing
about marriage . . . the Framers . . . entrusted” the
subject of domestic relations—including the definition of
111. Id. at 15–16.
112. Id.
113. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
114. Cott, supra note 7, at 1.
115. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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marriage—to the states. 116 Affirmatively citing DeBoer,
Roberts observes that, before and after statehood, the
four states whose laws are under challenge “defined
marriage in the traditional, biologically rooted way.”117
Like Sutton, Roberts endorses the responsible
procreation rationale for this definition of marriage. 118
Roberts concurs with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that,
rather than “‘constitutionalizing the definition of
marriage,’” it should be left in “the place it has been
since the founding: in the hands of state voters.” 119
Justice Alito argues similarly, charging the majority with
giving a “distinctively postmodern meaning” to Due
Process “liberty.” 120 Finally, Justice Thomas appeals to
how “the Framers” understood “liberty” to argue that
the Court is “deviating from the original meaning” of the
Due Process Clauses. 121
It is clear, thus, that none of the conservative
justices found the new originalism persuasive. What
about Justice Kennedy, who everyone assumed would be
the decisive vote one way or the other? To the extent
that amici pitched their new originalist arguments to “an
audience of one,”122 it is telling that while Justice
Kennedy’s opinion repeatedly referred to the “meaning”
of marriage as well as of liberty and equality, he
emphasized evolving meaning, not “original meaning.”
Further, he did not follow the route of deploying “original
meaning” to hold the state laws unconstitutional as sex
discrimination or (explicitly) as impermissible class
discrimination
prohibited
by
the
Fourteenth

116. Id.
117. Id. at 2614.
118. Id.; see supra Part II.A for discussion of this argument.
119. Id. at 2615.
120. Id. at 2640; see also id. at 2642 (because “the Constitution simply
does not speak to the issue of same-sex marriage” by including a “right to
marry a person of the same sex,” it falls to “the people,” not the Court, to
“control their destiny” and decide on whether to fundamentally change the
definition of marriage).
121. Id. at 2632–34 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122. Cf. Susan R. Estrich and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics:
Writing for an Audience of One 138 U. PENN. L. REV. 119 (1989) (making
argument for women’s reproductive rights aimed at Justice O’Connor).
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Amendment. 123 More obviously influential on Justice
Kennedy’s opinion than the new originalist briefs
discussed above were briefs filed by historians that
informed his account of these forms of evolution. As
Nancy Cott (coauthor of an influential amicus brief and a
frequent expert in marriage litigation) observed, “history
really matter[ed]” in Justice Kennedy’s landmark
majority opinion, specifically, the history of the
institution of marriage and how it has “changed over time
to admit new understandings of liberty and equality” as
well as “the history of condemnation and criminalization
of same-sex intimacy until recent decades.” 124 Kennedy
enlisted this history, I will argue, in service of a moral
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. THE OBERGEFELL MAJORITY OPINION: DUAL FORMS OF
EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING
Justice Kennedy’s landmark majority opinion in
Obergefell crucially deployed two forms of evolving
understanding—of constitutional guarantees of equality
and the “promise of liberty” as well as of the institution
of marriage. Those two forms of evolution worked
together in his opinion to reject a static notion either of
the fundamental right to marry or of marriage itself. They
both undergird the holding that same-sex couples may
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states.
They reflect a moral reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
With respect to the evolving understanding of the
Constitution’s “promise” of liberty, Kennedy opens the
Obergefell opinion with the declaration that: “The
Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a
liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow
persons within a lawful realm, to define and express their
identity.” 125 This language closely parallels the opening
123. Notably, an author on the Cato Institute Brief acknowledges that
Justice Kennedy did not adopt various originalist arguments. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The Marriage Equaltiy Cases and Constitutional Theory, 2015
CATO. SUP. CT. REV. 111.
124. Cott, supra note 7.
125. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
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passage of Lawrence v. Texas: “[l]iberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”126
Similarly, the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey declared: “It is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government
may not enter.”127
“Insight,” or evolving understanding, plays a critical
role in Lawrence, for example, about fulfilling “the
promise of liberty.” Lawrence ends with the often-quoted
passage that the ratifiers of the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not “presume”
to have the “insight” to map specifically all the
components of liberty, but instead “knew times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to oppress.” 128 Because of this temporal dimension
to understanding constitutional principles, Kennedy
adds: “As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search
for greater freedom.”129 The joint opinion in Casey made
a similar statement about the Constitution as “a covenant
running from the first generation of Americans to us and
then to future generations” and that “[e]ach generation
must learn anew that the Constitution’s written terms
embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more
ages than one.”130 In Fidelity to Our Imperfect
Constitution, Fleming points to both of these opinions—
and these passages—as exemplifying a moral reading
(pp. 58, 191).
Obergefell builds on this idea by observing that:
“[t]he nature of injustice is that we may not see it in our
own times.” 131 Thus, as “new insight” reveals “discord”
between the Constitution’s “central protections” and “a
received legal stricture,” claims of liberty “must be
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
505 U.S. 833, 844, 847 (1992).
539 U.S. at 578–79.
Id. at 579.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
135 S. Ct. at 2598.
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addressed.” 132 New insights about constitutional
guarantees intersect with new insights about marriage as
new generations help to reveal that what once seemed
“natural and just”—defining marriage only as the union
of one man and one woman—now is an injustice that is
“inconsisten[t] with the central meaning of the
fundamental right to marry.” 133 This view of marriage
stands in sharp contrast with that offered in the several
dissents, which argue for the unchanging, universal
definition and purpose of marriage. In Windsor, just two
years earlier, Justice Kennedy observed that New York’s
citizens and elected representatives, in enacting a law
allowing same-sex couples to marry, acted to “correct”
what they now perceived “to be an injustice that they had
not earlier known or understood.”134
Justice Kennedy’s opinion closely resembles the
opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, in
which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
stated that marriage is an “evolving paradigm”—rather
than static. 135 Moreover, Kennedy, like the Goodridge
court, goes further in contending that “new insights”
have spurred “deep transformations” that have
“strengthened, not weakened, the institution of
marriage.” 136 In canvassing these transformations,
Kennedy cites to the amicus brief filed by the Historians
of Marriage and the American Historical Association,137
which challenged the Sixth Circuit’s argument that
correcting any injustices in that law should be left to the
democratic process as community mores evolve. That
brief contends that: “[J]udicial review has often led to the
recognition that traditional or discriminatory views of
marriage (and marriage-related laws) must give way in
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2602.
134. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
135. 798 N.E.2d 941, 966–67 (Mass. 2003).
136. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595–96.
137. Brief of Historians of Marriage and the American Historical
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, -562, -571, and -574) [hereinafter
Marriage Historians Brief].
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the face of evolving understandings of race and gender
embodied in constitutional guarantees under the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 138
Countering the Sixth Circuit’s assertion of a universal
definition of marriage and marriage’s origin in
channelling procreation, the Marriage Historians Brief
chronicles the “multiple” political, social, economic,
legal, and personal purposes served by marriage as a
civil institution “[o]ver this Nation’s history” since the
founding. 139 The brief also charts the evolution of the
laws governing marriage as the Nation has recognized
the injustice of restricting some citizens from exercising
the right to marry. 140 While Judge Sutton rooted
marriage’s origin in laws of nature, the Marriage
Historians Brief points out how opponents of the demise
of coverture attacked its dismantling as “blasphemous
and unnatural,” contrary to Divine will; 141 opponents of
the striking down of antimiscegenation laws later warned
that “permitting cross-racial couples to marry would
fatally degrade the institution of marriage,” on the
premise that “marriages across the color line were
against nature, and against the Divine plan (as some
opponents argue today against same-sex marriage).” 142
While the dissents emphasize the determinative role
of history and tradition, Kennedy takes a more critical
approach to history. While conceding that the historical
understanding of marriage was a union between one man
and one woman, he rejects the respondent states’
argument that history is not only “the beginning of these
cases,” but also “should be the end as well.” 143 Instead,
he observes: “The history of marriage is one of both
continuity and change.” 144
In explaining how new insights about the injustice
within basic institutions such as marriage are gained,
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 21.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595.
Id.
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Kennedy again sounds the theme of generational moral
progress: “changed understandings of marriage are
characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of
freedom become apparent to new generations.”145
Further, social movements seeking change play a role,
since these new understandings often become apparent
“through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and
then are considered in the political sphere and the
judicial process.” 146 Kennedy’s view of the relationship
between democracy and constitutionalism differs notably
from Judge Sutton’s and from the Obergefell dissents.
What new insights about marriage inform the
majority’s holding that same-sex couples may exercise
the fundamental right to marry? One source of insight is
the substantial body of case law growing out of
challenges by same-sex couples to state marriage laws
and to the federal DOMA, beginning back in the 1990s
in Hawaii and proliferating post-Windsor. Kennedy says
that case law has helped to “explain and formulate the
underlying principles” about the right to marry that the
Court concludes apply equally to same-sex and oppositesex couples. 147
Another significant “new insight” involving “changing
understandings” arising out of social movements and
“pleas and protests” is not about marriage as such, but
about the capacity of gay men and lesbians to enter into
it. To chronicle this “dynamic,” Kennedy draws on
another historical brief, filed by the Organization of
American Historians. 148 That history includes long moral
condemnation of “same-sex intimacy,” a condemnation
expressed in the criminal law (upheld in Bowers v.
Hardwick but eventually struck down in Lawrence). 149
Kennedy observes that the Supreme Court, “like many
145. Id. at 2596.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2597.
148. Brief of the Organization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos.
14-556, -562, -571, -574).
149. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (citing Organization of American
Historians Brief, supra note 136, 5-28).
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institutions,” made “assumptions defined by the world
and time of which it is a part,” thus issuing a one
sentence summary affirmance (in 1972) in one of the
earliest challenges by a same-sex couple to state
marriage laws, Baker v. Nelson, which Obergefell
overrules. 150 That history also includes a failure to
appreciate the dignitary claims of gays and lesbians and,
prior to 1973, a labeling of their sexual orientation as a
mental disorder rather than as a “normal expression of
human sexuality and immutable.” 151
Three prior Kennedy opinions—Romer, Lawrence,
and Windsor—all were turning points in marking this new
insight; those opinions have characteristic vocabulary of
concern for dignity and respect and not demeaning the
existence of gay men and lesbians. Windsor shifts the
focus to the dignity and respect conferred by the bond
of marriage itself upon same-sex couples and the
message of inequality sent by DOMA when it fails to
recognize their marriages. Windsor involved a two-step
process: (1) Lawrence declaring that the intimate lives
of same-sex couples were worthy of dignity and respect;
and (2) the state of New York conferring dignity and
respect and community stature through allowing such
couples to marry. 152 By contrast, Obergefell holds that
those couples may exercise that right pursuant to the
Federal Constitution itself, in light of evolving
understandings both of constitutional freedom and of
marriage.
Two other new insights about marriage warrant
mention because they contribute to the majority’s
conclusion that deep transformations in marriage
actually strengthen the institution: the demise of laws
barring interracial marriage and the repudiation of
gender hierarchy in marriage. As discussed in Part II,
these two transformations feature prominently in prior
marriage equality jurisprudence, as evidenced in the
DeBoer dissent and the Goodridge majority. Kennedy
relates these insights to the intertwining of Due Process
150. Id. at 2598.
151. Id. at 2596.
152. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2677, 2694 (2013).
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and Equal Protection in understanding the scope of the
right to marry. The intertwining or “synergy” between
these two clauses is another characteristic theme in
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence. 153 He invokes Loving v.
Virginia to illustrate the “interrelation” of the
independent principles of each Clause. The Court’s
invalidation of racial restrictions on who may marry drew
on both Equal Protection and Due Process. While
conventional understandings of Loving have emphasized
its equal protection holding, Justice Kennedy argues that
looking at liberty and equality together helped to make
“the reasons why marriage is a fundamental right
bec[o]me more clear and compelling.” 154 Notably,
Kennedy refers to this understanding as coming from a
“full awareness and understanding of the hurt that
resulted” from such laws. 155 Hurt and humiliation, of
course, was a large theme in Windsor and in numerous
post-Windsor federal opinions; it is not a prominent
theme in the economically written Loving opinion
itself. 156
In a passage that may reflect the influence of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy offers his second
example of how interpreting the Equal Protection Clause
can lead the Court to recognize “that new insights and
societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality
within our most fundamental institutions that once
passed unnoticed and unchallenged.” 157 That example is
that, even in the 1970s and 1980s, “invidious sex-based
classifications in marriage remained common”; such
153. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. Similarly, in Goodridge, Chief Justice
Marshall—citing Perez and Lawrence—observed that, “in matters implicating
marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children, the two constitutional
concepts [of liberty and equality] frequently overlap as they do here.” 798
N.E.2d at 953.
154. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
155. Id.
156. In her dissent in DeBoer, Judge Daughtrey led with the majority’s
disturbing lack of attention to the “actual plaintiffs as persons, suffering actual
harm,” as well as the impact of the restrictive laws upon their children,
drawing on the extensive trial record about the capacity of gay and lesbian
parents to rear children. 772 F.3d at 421–28.
157. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
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laws “denied the equal dignity of men and women.” The
Court, “responding to a new awareness,” used equal
protection principles “to invalidate laws imposing sexbased inequality on marriage.” 158
Kennedy, thus, observes that the Court has
“correct[ed] inequalities” based on race and sex within
the institution of marriage, thus vindicating “precepts of
liberty and equality.” 159 His opinion also notes the
intertwining of liberty and equality in Lawrence and then
asserts that the same dynamic applies to same-sex
marriage. The significance of evolving understanding is
evident when the Court states: “It is now clear that the
challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples
. . . and . . . abridge central precepts of equality.”160
Significant themes about denial of liberty and equality
join together here: against a “long history of disapproval
of their relationships”—recall the constitutional limits in
liberty and equality cases on singling out a group based
on moral disapproval—this denial of the right to marry
“works a grave and continuing harm.”161 The denial
imposes a “disability” on them that “serves to disrespect
and subordinate them.” 162 Although Romer is not cited
here, that opinion noted the disability imposed by
Amendment
2
forbidding
protection
against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
conduct. 163 To be sure, new originalists might well argue
that the majority’s use of the language of imposing a
“disability” upon a class that is singled out is consistent
with the “original meaning” of the Fourteenth
Amendment as anti-class legislation. 164 I believe,
though, that the role of evolving understanding of the
meaning of constitutional guarantees, so prevalent in
Kennedy’s opinion, signals a moral reading. For instance,
Kennedy states:
158. Id. at 2604.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
164. See Cato Institute Brief, supra note 15, at 17–24 (arguing that
restrictive state marriage laws expand an “anti-gay caste regime”).
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The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may
long have seemed natural and just, but its
inconsistency with the central meaning of the
fundamental right to marry is now manifest. With that
knowledge must come the recognition that laws
excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right
impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our
basic charter. 165

While new factual understandings play a role, normative
judgments about justice and about rights also evolve.
By contrast to Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the
evolution of the institution of marriage to correct
injustices within it, Chief Justice Roberts rejects the idea
that these were “fundamental” transformations. On his
view, the fundamental (essential) character of marriage
through all these changes was as a one man-one woman
institution. This minimizing strategy is unpersuasive.
Defenders of bans on interracial marriage stressed
marriage’s link to procreation; preventing mixed-race
offspring was a central rationale offered for those
laws. 166 Further, the Marriage Historians Brief and other
briefs emphasized some of the similarity in arguments
made in defense of these laws and of bans on same-sex
marriage. 167
Roberts is also unpersuasive when he asserts that if
you asked a person on the street, while state marriage
law embraced the common law’s model of gender
hierarchy, they would never had defined marriage as “the
union of a man and a woman, where the woman is subject
to coverture.” 168 They may well not have used the term
“coverture,” but many likely would have had an everyday
understanding of marriage as a domestic relation in
which husband and wife occupied distinct, and
165. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (emphasis added).
166. See generally PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY (2009).
167. Marriage Historians Brief, supra note 137, at 22–23. See Brief
Amicus Curiae of Carlos A. Ball et al. in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, -562, -571, -574) (drawing
parallels between “pseudoscientific” and “pseudoempirical” justifications
offered for antimiscegenation laws and opposition to same-sex marriage).
168. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614.
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complementary gender roles, with the husband as the
head of the household and representative of the family
in public life, and the wife as subject to and properly
dependent upon her husband. Civil marriage, as the
Marriage Historians Brief explains, developed in Western
political culture as closely related to governance, in
particular, with male heads of households as “delegates”
for those within the household.169
C. A ROAD NOT TAKEN: SEX DISCRIMINATION
Kennedy declined to make a full-blown sex
discrimination argument for striking down state marriage
laws limiting marriage to one man and one woman,
although such an argument was among those advanced
by the petitioners and a number of amici. If Justice
Ginsburg had written a concurring opinion that (similar
to Judge Berzon) elaborated that sex discrimination
rationale,
the
Court’s
new
Equal
Protection
jurisprudence and corresponding changes in family law
would likely have been central components. While, as
noted above, the Legal Scholars Brief offered this
argument as consistent with “original meaning” of the
Fourteenth Amendment, I would argue that any such
Ginsburg opinion would likely have evidence of a moral
reading. Fleming argues, for example, that Ginsburg, like
Justice Brennan, is a moral reader who believes that “the
point of adopting and amending the Constitution is not to
embody longstanding historical practices but to
transform them in pursuit of our constitutional
aspirations to normative principles like liberty equality
and liberty” (p. 44). Ginsburg long ago called for “boldly
dynamic interpretation,” rather than an “original
understanding” approach to change the long history of
“empty-cupboard” jurisprudence with respect to sex
equality. 170 Ginsburg, like Justice O’Connor before her,
has given her share of speeches pointing out some of
the “greatest hits” (or, I suppose, “greatest misses”) in
the Court’s long history of failing to treat women as
169. Marriage Historians Brief, supra note 137, at 7.
170. See Ginsburg, supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Case,
supra note 23.
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equals to men and its upholding of aspects of the law of
coverture and of separate spheres ideology. 171 While
some prominent feminist constitutional scholars support
sex discrimination as a constitutional hook for striking
down the one man-one woman definition of marriage, 172
they do so not by appealing to “original understanding”
or “original public meaning” either of marriage or of
equality. The dissenting opinion by Judge Daughtrey, as
well as the underlying concurring opinion by Judge
Berzon, discussed in Part II are instructive.
D. THE FOUR PRINCIPLES AND REASONED JUDGMENT
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s method of identifying four
principles underlying the reason that the right to marry
is fundamental also evidence a moral reading. In looking
to such principles the majority rejects Glucksberg, which
defined “liberty” in a “circumscribed” manner, by
reference to “specific historical practices.” 173 Kennedy
counters that such an approach is inconsistent with the
approach used when fundamental rights are at stake,
such as the right to marry. 174 Kennedy cites Loving and
Lawrence to elaborate on the limits of historical
practices: “If rights were defined by who exercised them
in the past, then received practices could serve as their
own continued justification and new groups could not
invoke rights once denied.” 175 Kennedy further invokes
Justice Harlan’s method of reasoned judgment and
rejects the reduction of Due Process to a narrow
formula. “History and tradition guide and discipline this
inquiry [of identifying fundamental rights], but do not set
its outer boundaries.” 176

171. The concurring opinion by Justice Bradley in Bradwell v. State, 83
U.S. 130 (1873), is a standard text in such presentations of the history of
the Court’s treatment of women’s status under the Constitution. As noted in
text, it is similarly cited in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
172. Case, supra note 23.
173. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2598.
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The majority identifies four “underlying principles”
that demonstrate that “the reasons marriage is
fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal
force to same-sex couples.” 177 These principles about
marriage stress both goods and rights; that marriage
simultaneously has public and private dimensions. 178 So,
too, Justice Kennedy affirms—as one principle—that
marriage is an institution “at the center” of “many facets
of the legal and social order”—a “keystone of our social
order.” Its very centrality makes exclusion from it all the
more unjust and, to use another term favored by
Kennedy, “urgent.” 179 Taking a page from Goodridge,
Justice Kennedy stresses that prior transformations of
marriage in response to newly-perceived injustices have
strengthened, not weakened it. He concludes that
respondents have not shown a foundation for concluding
that allowing same-sex marriage will cause the harmful
outcomes they predict; while he does not explicitly
predict the institution will thrive with this new step, he
certainly, in an allusion to Lawrence, makes clear that
these new marriages “pose no risk of harm,” including
to third parties. 180 This discussion of what marriage is
and what its purposes are contrasts sharply with the
more truncated view offered in Chief Justice Roberts’s
dissent (and in the Sixth Circuit majority opinion). The
Obergefell majority observes that, as marriage has
evolved over time, so too have understandings of its
purposes. Kennedy’s elaboration of the four principles
emphasizes rights and their gradual extension to those
previously excluded, another way in which he offers a
moral reading of the Constitution.

177. Id. at 2599.
178. In other work, James Fleming and I point out the dual focus on rights
(to autonomy and self-definition) and moral goods in Goodridge and in the
California marriage case, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
See JAMES E. FLEMING AND LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013).
179. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
180. Id. at 2607.
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CONCLUSION
To return to my opening questions: what’s in a
name? Why do definitions matter? At issue in this
symposium are the boundaries of competing approaches
to constitutional interpretation and what the respective
promise of moral readings and originalisms are for
controversies like this marriage definition battle. One
aim of Fleming’s book is to point out that new originalists
are moving in directions that seem to embrace methods
that old (and some new) originalists condemned—when
practiced by moral readers—as out of bounds (pp. 3-19).
The move to “original meaning” or “original public
meaning,” for example, seeks to free interpreters from
being bound by historical applications that were based
on factual assumptions that later generations (and even
some at the time) rightly view as incorrect. Certainly,
feminists are acutely familiar with wrong-headed
assumptions about women’s capacities and roles and the
way in which those assumptions have rationalized their
inequality, over time, in the economic, familial, political,
and legal spheres. Thus, it is certainly intriguing and
worth noting when prominent originalist theorists wish to
champion prohibiting sex discrimination as a proper aim
of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if that aim was
realized tardily. So, too, it was intriguing, as the Court
considered Obergefell, to learn of the attempts by some
originalists to make a constitutional “case” for same-sex
marriage as flowing from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
original meaning prohibiting class or caste legislation. I
shall not “rule” on whether these developments fit
comfortably within a “big tent” originalism 181 or whether,
as Fleming would likely argue, they are better seen as
the incorporation of moral reading methods, such that
these originalists should “reconceive their projects as
being in support of the moral reading”—rather than as
181. Cf. Lawrence Solum, What Should Count as an Originalist Case for a
Right to Same Sex Marriage, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015),

http://lsolum.typepad.com/
legaltheory/2015/01/what-should-count-as-an-originalist-case-for-a-right-tosame-sex-marriage.htm.
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“offering alternatives to it”—and join the moral reading
big tent (p. 97). As Fleming observes, while “there is no
hope” of reconciling old originalism—of the sort evident
in Judge Sutton’s opinion and some of the Obergefell
dissents—with moral reading, the “prospects for
reconciliation” of new originalism and moral readings are
more promising (pp. 48-49). These arguments about
new appreciation of the proper application of
constitutional principles as new understandings dawn
bring to mind the theme of generational and moral
progress sounded at the end of Lawrence v. Texas and
echoed in a number of post-Windsor opinions: “As the
Constitution endures persons in every generation can
invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom.”182 Fittingly, Fleming closes his book with this
passage, urging citizens, scholars, and judges to be
moral readers who are mindful that the Constitution
establishes a “framework for a self-governing people to
build out over time in light of experience together with
moral and political learning” (p. 191).

182. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–89.

